



In a book review published in 2003, Holt lamented that ‘Magna Carta seems no longer to be 
an active field of study.’1 The only exceptions he noticed were David Carpenter’s proposed 
revision of Holt’s dating of the document itself,2 and Richard Helmholz’s attempt to 
demonstrate that contemporary Roman and Canon law – the ius commune – had heavily 
influenced its drafting.3 Great works of historical scholarship can indeed have the unintended 
consequence of closing down debate, because they seem so self-evidently right that there 
appears to be nothing more to be said. But Holt’s gloom was premature.  
Justice and Jurisdiction  
In truth, a major stimulus for activity was Holt’s second edition of his Magna Carta, which 
appeared in 1992.4 He had once considered a clause-by-clause commentary, but rejected the 
idea because ‘it soon became apparent that this would require almost encyclopaedic bulk.’ 
Instead the thematic structure remained. There was some limited rewriting of the main text 
and also changes in the appendices. Some appendices remained unmodified, but others were 
extended, and others still were new. Several included forceful reassertion of Holt’s earlier 
opinions, as criticisms were met not with solid defence but rather with characteristically 
pugnacious drives back past the bowler.5  
 By far the most significant change, though, was the inclusion of a lengthy and very 
detailed new chapter entitled ‘Justice and jurisdiction’. The chapter’s first sentence presents it 
as supplementing those on ‘Privilege and liberties’ and ‘Custom and law’: ‘These matters 
must now be set in a jurisdictional framework; for men wove their political theories from 
                                                          
1 E.H.R., CXVIII (2003), 988-9.   
2 Carpenter (1996a). 
3 Helmholz (1999). 
4 For changes from the first edition, note Holt (1992), pp. xiii-xiv.  
5 See esp. Appendices nos 1, 9, 10 [cf. Holt (1965), Appendix no. VI]. Appendix no. 2 prints 
a new document significant for the analysis of aids; no. 7 discusses translations of the 
Charters, on which Holt had written since the first edition – see Holt (1974); no. 14 discusses 
grants in perpetuity. The discussion of the manuscripts of the Charter and their drafting is 
modified in Appendix no. 6; for further discussion of these subjects, see below, p. 000. The 
discussion of ‘the Twenty-Five’ in Appendix no. 8 [Holt (1965), no. V] is extended because 
of the discovery of a further relevant text by Christopher Cheney; see also the paragraph 
added at Holt (1992), pp. 345-6. For further examples of re-writing and additions within the 
main text, see e.g. Holt (1992), pp. 10-12, cf. Holt (1965), pp. 9-10. The second edition also 
made some minor changes, for example to the spelling of names (e.g. Eustace de Vesci in the 
first edition, Eustace de Vescy in the second). 
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words first spun in legal contexts.’6 The chapter therefore reinforces Holt’s determination to 
explain Magna Carta and its contents through their context.7 The first edition had already 
shown great and necessary concern with royal provision of justice, especially but not 
exclusively in Chapter 4 on ‘Custom and law’.8 However, the new chapter displayed a 
marked change in emphasis. In it Holt stated that 
The crisis of jurisdiction which occurred in the years either side of 1215 has been 
explained traditionally in personal terms: King John undid the good work of his 
father. … Such an explanation, in which the supposed psyche of the king is derived 
from the very facts it is supposed to explain, will not do. The king’s personality 
mattered. The inadequacy of jurisdictional structure and legal procedure mattered 
much more.9  
If the argument of Chapter 4 focuses on the personal role of John and the quality of the 
justice which he provided,10 that of the new Chapter 5 concentrates on a structural problem: 
the weak position of the tenants-in-chief resulting from their lack of access to the new routine 
remedies that the Angevin legal reforms had provided for all other free landholders: 
It has long been recognized that the cry for justice in 1215 exhibited some very 
peculiar, apparently contradictory features. On the one hand the Charter demanded 
that royal justice should be more accessible and better administered. On the other, it 
forbade unlawful arrests and disseisin, the sale or delay of justice, and it promised 
restitution for unjust fines and amercements. Apparently men wanted more but were 
not altogether pleased with what they had. This contrast is striking and is to be 
explained by another. The common law of the Angevins gave the undertenant the 
                                                          
6 Holt (1992), p. 123. 
7 See e.g. Holt (1992), p. 21 [= Holt (1965), p. 18].  
8 Outside Chapter 4, see e.g. Holt (1992), pp. 28-30, 32, 201-2, 323-32 [= Holt (1965), pp. 
23-5, 27, 116-17, 223-30]. 
9 Holt (1992), pp. 179-80. 
10 There are places in other chapters where the structural argument might have been made but 
was not; see e.g. Holt (1992), pp. 83-4, 112-13, 121, 303, 323-4 [= Holt (1965), pp. 70-1, 95-
6, 103, 206, 223-4]. At Holt (1992), p. 117 [= Holt (1965), p. 100] the distinction made is 
chronological rather than tenurial: John ‘might be condemned as an innovator, but not his 
father. … Magna Carta left much of Henry II’s work untouched.’ In the second edition 
Chapter 4’s emphasis on the judgement of the king’s court has, of course, to be read in the 
light of the new chapter’s emphasis that the king’s court is one with no superior, removing 




opportunities and protection of varied routine procedures. But it left the tenant-in-
chief still exposed to the vagaries of the king’s will. This is the clue to the judicial 
provisions of the Charter.11  
John’s interest in judicial matters remains relevant, as does the quality of justice that he 
provided, but the focus on structure reveals the particular jurisdictional framework within 
which John treated the tenants-in-chief: structural asymmetry allowed, perhaps required, 
personal involvement.12  
The germ of the new chapter’s central argument can be found in the first edition, with 
reference to  
the ultimate unwillingness of the Crown to submit itself to conventional or enacted 
rules similar to those it was imposing on others. … 1215 marked the decision to 
demand from the Crown that regularity of procedure and treatment which barons, 
knights and townsfolk had come to expect and had been led to accept in their dealings 
with each other.13  
Yet, unlike the preceding quotation from the new Chapter 5, the paragraph in which these 
statements appear is not permeated with the language of lordship or of tenure. This may be a 
clue as to the origin of the emphatic argument of the new chapter, the need that Holt felt for 
its inclusion. If the anomalous position of the king as lordless lord was present in J. E. A. 
Jolliffe’s Angevin Kingship, the process whereby it emerged was revealed in S. F. C. 
Milsom’s Legal Framework of English Feudalism, published in 1976.14 The Legal 
Framework argued that the Angevin reforms destroyed the sovereignty of the honorial 
lordship, through the routine provision of royal actions available to all free tenants. Only one 
lordship remained sovereign, that of the king. Now the text of the second edition of Magna 
                                                          
11 Holt (1992), p. 123.  
12 See e.g. Holt (1992), pp. 180-1 (the passage quoted above – ‘The crisis … much more’ is 
followed by the statement that ‘Yet in one matter the traditional account comes close to the 
facts. Whatever his influence, malign or not, King John took a close personal interest in the 
supervision of justice. Whatever the inadequacies of the system, he certainly jolted it.’); also 
pp. 186-7.  
13 Holt (1992), p. 35 [= Holt (1965), pp. 29-30]. 
14 There is no reference to Jolliffe in the new chapter; for references to Jolliffe’s Angevin 
Kingship elsewhere in the book, see Holt (1992), pp. 81 n. 27, 95 n. 94 [= Holt, (1965), pp. 
68 n. 2, 80 n. 4]. The extent of Jolliffe’s influence on Milsom is uncertain, although Angevin 
Kingship is one of the small number of secondary works that appear in the footnotes of The 
Legal Framework of English Feudalism, at p. 25 n. 1.  
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Carta does not provide any clear proof of the influence of Milsom on Holt. There is one 
footnote reference to the Legal Framework added in Chapter 4, two in Chapter 11, and six in 
the new Chapter 5.15 Almost all refer to specific points rather than to Milsom’s broader 
arguments. Instead, proof of influence must come from remembered conversations, as when 
Holt firmly told a first-year DPhil doctoral supervisee early in 1985 that Legal Framework 
was ‘the most important book since Stenton’s First Century.’ Or from comparison between 
his article on ‘Politics and Property’ published in 1972 and his Royal Historical Society 
Presidential Addresses published in 1982-5, together with a brief discussion in a note added 
to the 1997 reprint of ‘Politics and Property’ in his Colonial England.16 Or from the very 
language of Chapter 5. Within the common law ‘there still remained the king’s jurisdiction 
over his immediate vassals. … It was primitive, and its essence was lordship.’17 The 
resemblance to Milsom is obvious, and there is a further echo in the following statement: ‘To 
call this [jurisdiction] feudal is to use a word to which there are now fashionable if 
misdirected objections.’ Such may not be absolute proof of influence, but as Milsom says at 
the very start of the Legal Framework, ‘there will be no more evidence for the most 
important lines in your picture than that they fit with the demonstrable detail. They are either 
obvious or wrong.’18 
                                                          
15 Chapter 4: p. 105 n. 146 (descent and tenure); Chapter 5: p. 128 nn. 22, 24, p. 132 n. 43 
(Milsom on the disciplinary origins of novel disseisin), p. 142 n. 78, p. 150 n. 111, p. 161 n. 
166; Chapter 11: p. 383 nn. 15-16. White (1974) may have prompted some initial thoughts, 
and was taken very seriously in the rejoinder by Holt (1974b); the choice of extract to reprint 
in Holt (1997) is significant of the weight Holt attached to White’s piece. Note further Holt 
(1992), p. 123, on legal developments under the Angevins and the minority of Henry III: ‘the 
protection of the law moved up, not down, the social scale’; cf. Holt (1974b), 133, primarily 
on the preceding period and defending the position in Holt (1972b): ‘it would be hazardous to 
assume that the apparent logic of the terms of enfeoffment at a particular feudal and social 
level may be used to define rights of inheritance in general. To be sure, one level infected 
another; the provisions about relief, marriage, widowhood and wardship in the charter of 
liberties of Henry I were extended beyond the king to the conduct of his barons; but the 
infection moved down rather than up the feudal hierarchy and tended towards inheritance 
rather than against it.’ 
16 Holt (1972b); Holt, (1974b); Holt (1982b, 1983, 1984b, 1985b); Holt (1997), p. 157, where 
the phrase ‘It was written P.M. (pre-Milsom)’ indicates the pivotal significance that Holt then 
attached to Legal Framework. The influence of Milsom on Holt may have subsequently 
declined somewhat, although again evidence is primarily anecdotal. 
17 Holt (1992), p. 127. 
18 Milsom (1976), p. 1.  
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Magna Carta, Holt argued, was a major step in correcting the structural anomaly that 
had arisen because of the Angevin reforms:  
By and large it approved of what the undertenant had enjoyed and condemned what 
the tenant-in-chief had suffered. Hence it sought to give the magnate a legal security 
like that enjoyed by the freeman. During the minority of Henry III this was largely 
achieved.19 
Immediately after the settlement at Runnymede John made restorations to some of those 
tenants-in-chief who had suffered from his arbitrary actions, and cases went to the king’s 
court.20 
The Twenty-Five [barons responsible for ensuring royal enforcement of the Charter’s 
terms] probably played a large part in these cases. They were not conducting a 
revolution. The procedures followed were not new. All that happened is that routine 
processes governing seisin and right were introduced into the operations of the king’s 
court.21 
The minority of Henry III ensured that ‘for ten years after John’s death actions of right, 
disseisin, mort d’ancestor, the final concord became the standard currency of the court.’22 
‘The mechanism at the heart of these changes was the writ praecipe’, in the form of the writ 
praecipe in capite. In this, ‘the baron finally achieved a general writ of right, the first and the 
only one he ever had. … Its appearance in the eyre begun in 1218 set the seal on the victory 
of 1215.’23 There are early signs of such a development in John’s reign. Most significant is 
the appearance of a writ praecipe for lands of half a knight’s fee or less in the Irish Register 
of Writs, which may be dated as early as 1210:  
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command B. that, justly and without delay, he 
render to A. half a knight’s fee … in N. which he claims to hold of the lord king for so 
much service … and whereof he complains that this B. has deforced him.24 
                                                          
19 Holt (1992), p. 123. 
20 Holt (1992), pp. 165-7. 
21 Holt (1992), p. 167. 
22 Holt (1992), p. 167. 
23 Holt (1992), p. 173. 
24 Early Registers of Writs, p. 2. Cf. such cases with ones where a plaintiff was claiming that 
he should hold in chief of the king but the king was retaining the land in demesne (the 
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However, Holt ‘found no action between barons concerning a tenancy-in-chief defined in 
such terms’ and concluded therefore that ‘the praecipe in capite … was a great unrecorded 
baronial victory that gave backbone to cap. 40 of the Charter’, which specified that ‘to no one 
will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice.’25 
 Holt’s arguments in the new chapter received considerable criticism from David 
Carpenter in an article published in 1996 and entitled ‘Justice and Jurisdiction under King 
John and King Henry III’.26 The majority of the article and the most telling criticisms concern 
the reign of Henry III, where Carpenter convincingly shows that Magna Carta had less effect 
on controlling royal conduct of cases involving tenants-in-chief than Holt may have 
suggested. Regarding the writ praecipe in capite, Carpenter lays much greater emphasis than 
Holt on its presence in the Irish Register of Writs under John. Yet Carpenter admits that that 
writ in the Register was only routinely and cheaply available ‘de cursu’ for cases involving 
half a knight’s fee or less. He comments that ‘such restrictions were attached to other writs in 
Ireland. Whether they also applied to praecipe in capite in England seems impossible to say.’ 
Such is a major qualification, especially given the lack of plea roll evidence for cases 
described in such terms.27 Nor does Carpenter examine the issue of lack of access to writs 
concerned only with seisin rather than right, writs such as novel disseisin and mort 
d’ancestor; these were at the heart of the Angevin reforms and of Holt’s view of the structural 
problem of justice revealed by Magna Carta. Such writs do appear in cases that Carpenter 
cites from Henry III’s reign, although again not leading automatically to routine procedure.28 
Carpenter’s article therefore modifies our view of the context that produced Magna Carta 
rather less than our view of the Charter’s impact. Despite the Charter, despite the minority of 
Henry III, the problem remained of what to do in cases of default of justice when the person 
defaulting was the king, the still lordless-lord.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
simplest form of ‘vertical’ case in Milsom’s terms); this form of praecipe quod reddat was no 
help to the aspiring tenant-in-chief in the latter type of case.  
25 Holt (1992), p. 174 n. 218. As Holt admitted in a different context, it is possible that some 
writs praecipe were not described by that word in the plea rolls; Holt (1992), p. 142; Hudson 
(2012), p. 559. 
26 Carpenter (1996b). Carpenter does not interpret the new chapter as reflecting the influence 
of Milsom. 
27 Carpenter (1996b), pp. 21-3. It is notable that at p. 22 Carpenter goes on to argue that the 
point of real significance is that praecipe in capite did not produce routine procedure in 
litigation under Henry III; it is Holt’s position on the contrast with Henry III’s reign rather 
than the situation under John that is most forcefully under attack.  
28 Carpenter (1996b), pp. 26, 28, 31, 34. 
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 In 1215 the solution had been the security clause and the appointment of the Twenty-
Five.29 Unfortunately the second edition’s new chapter did not add an extended new 
discussion of the clause, and the Twenty-Five are mentioned only with regard to specific 
cases.30 Elsewhere in the book Holt stated that execution of the provisions of the Charter ‘was 
to be enforced by distraint, the customary method which all understood and used.’31 Had he 
returned to the subject in the new chapter on Justice and Jurisdiction he might have pointed 
out that distraint lies at the very heart of what Milsom calls ‘disciplinary jurisdiction’, the 
means by which a lord enforced his lordship in relation to his men, by taking goods and 
lands. The security clause of Magna Carta in 1215 provided that if the king or his servants 
offended ‘against anyone in any way, or transgress any of the articles of peace and security’, 
should the offence not be redressed within forty days after due complaint and procedure, the 
case was to be referred to the Twenty-Five:  
and those twenty-five barons with the commune of all the land shall distrain and 
distress us in every way they can, namely by seizing castles, lands and possessions, 
and in such other ways as they can, saving our person and those of our queen and our 
children, until, in their judgement, amends have been made; and when it has been 
redressed they are to obey us as they did before. 
Magna Carta thus provided the wrongdoing king with at least a temporary lord.32 But the 
security clause was dropped from the re-issues of the Charter and therefore, as Carpenter has 
shown, the problem of the lordless lord failing to provide justice remained. 
Continental context: Politics 
                                                          
29 Holt (1992), pp. 468-73 [= Holt (1965), pp. 332-7]. For an alternative version of the clause, 
note Holt (1992), pp. 345 [= Holt (1965), p. 241], 445. 
30 Holt (1992), pp. 166-7.  
31 Holt (1992), p. 272 [= Holt, (1965), pp. 179-80]; see also pp. 99, 343-5 [Holt (1965), pp. 
84, 239-41]. 
32 Hudson (2012), p. 852. Paradoxically, the ‘commune of the land’ was not only the quasi-
lord created here but also the beneficiary of the Charter. It is conceivable that the barons and 
others had been encouraged in thinking about the issue of lordship over the king by John’s 
surrender of the realm to the pope in 1213, his receipt of it back as a ‘feodarius’, and his 
swearing of homage to the pope for it. Some must also have been aware that the French 
king’s seizure of many of John’s Continental lands had received legal justification from 
John’s failure to attend the court of the king of France, his lord, to answer complaints brought 
against him; see e.g. Selected Letters of Innocent III, pp. 60-2. Cf. the means of enforcement 
indicated in Continental grants of liberties, which take different forms, for example 
renunciation of fealty, resistance without accusation of treachery, and excommunication; see 
Holt (1992), pp. 78-9 [= Holt (1965), pp. 66-7]. 
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If the new chapter introduced in the second edition focused very much on England, one of the 
distinctive features of Holt’s Magna Carta more generally is its examination of Continental 
Europe to provide context and comparison for twelfth-century governmental developments, 
for early thirteenth-century English political events, and for the Charter itself.33  Comparative 
exploration has not been taken much further,34 but some recent work has considered the 
relationship between political events in southern France and Iberia and the crisis that John 
faced in England particularly from 1212.35   
 Prominent amongst these was the Albigensian Crusade.  Holt’s view was that there 
were significant parallels between the Statute of Pamiers of 1212 and the Charter of 1215 but 
no influence.36  However, a picture of closer ties between the Crusade and developments in 
England can be sketched, one that might suggest possible direct links between the making of 
grants at Pamiers and Runnymede, if not between the precise contents, vocabulary, or 
structure of those grants.  The leader of the Albigensian Crusade was Simon de Montfort, and 
the Dunstable Annals mention a rumour that baronial conspirators had chosen [elegerant] 
him as king of England.37  The accuracy of this statement is uncertain, and the annalist puts it 
under 1210 whereas 1212 would be the correct year.  Even if the statement is trustworthy and 
the rumour was true, there is no evidence that Simon knew of the choice, although his enmity 
with John is clear38 as also is John’s lack of support for the Crusade particularly in its first 
years.39  However, connections between the Crusade and English opponents of John are 
certain.  Hugh de Lacy rebelled against John and was expelled from his lands in England and 
Ireland in 1210.  He was thereafter close to Simon de Montfort on the Crusade.40  Perhaps 
still more significant is the presence on the Crusade of the Lincolnshire knight Walter 
                                                          
33 See esp. Holt (1992), pp. 25-6 (the effect of war on other European grants of liberties), 75-
80 (on liberties), 114-15 (on appeal to the situation under good old kings), 188-9 (on the 
impact of defeat at Bouvines), 272-8 (on the extent of grants of liberties), 284-6 (on 
churchmen’s influence on grants of liberties) [= Holt (1965), pp. 20-1, 63-8, 97-8, 105-6, 
180-5, 190-2]. 
34 Note Vincent (2012), pp. 245-6. 
35 See Vincent (2012); Taylor (1999), on the relations between John and Innocent III in the 
context of the Albigensian Crusade; also Vincent (2002b), p. 75, on the significance of the 
battle of Muret. 
36 Holt (1992), p. 80 [= Holt, (1965), pp. 67-8]; Vincent (2012), pp. 245-8, is cautious on the 
likelihood of influence. 
37 Annales monastici, III, 33.  
38 See Taylor (1999), pp. 216-17, in particular on Simon’s claim to the earldom of Leicester. 
39 Taylor (1999), Vincent (2002b). 
40 Taylor (1999), pp. 217-18; Vincent (2002b), p. 73; see also Power (2013), 1069. 
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Langton, brother of Stephen Langton, the archbishop of Canterbury whose importance to the 
Charter has been a matter of considerable and continuing debate.41 
 Such connections may persuade us to attach more weight to the Dunstable annalist’s 
story, and even to consider the possibility of the king’s opponents having knowledge that a 
written grant of customs had been made at Pamiers.  The baronial leader Robert fitzWalter, 
too, must have known of the Crusade, as he fled to France in 1212.42  Unfortunately we know 
little of his activities during his exile, although he was in touch with the king of France.43  
Nevertheless, one may speculate that the ideology of the Albigensian Crusade may underlie 
the title that fitzWalter was given in 1215, ‘Marshal of the Army of God and of the Holy 
Church in England’.44  It was a title with which Holt had little sympathy: he first called it 
‘imposing’, then referred to it dismissively as ‘the best title they could manage’, and finally 
described it - in an addition to the second edition - as ‘vainglorious and seditious.’45   
Such condemnation may reflect Holt’s generally secular assessment of 1215.  Even if 
influence from the Albigensian Crusade, or crusading ideology more generally,46 is rejected, 
Robert fitzWalter and his title do indicate the close links between some lay rebels, 
ecclesiastics, and the religious terms in which reform was conceived and presented.  When 
Robert went into exile in 1212 it was with Gervase of Howbridge, a canon of St Paul’s who 
was probably closely associated with criticisms of John’s kingship.47  Robert’s restoration in 
1213 was included as part of the settlement between king and Church.48  And the title 
‘Marshal of the Army of God and the Holy Church in England’ is mirrored in the opening of 
                                                          
41 Taylor (1999), p. 218; Vincent (2002b), p. 73.  For a third brother, Simon Langton, see 
below, p. 000; the Langton family’s connection to the events of 1215 may have been 
underestimated by debate focussing on the role of Archbishop Stephen. 
42 Walt. Cov., II, 207; Chron. Maj., II, 534; Holt (1961), pp. 82-3. 
43 Holt (1961), p. 88. 
44 See Holt (1992), p. 490 (agreement concerning London) [= Holt (1965), p. 342]; also 
Chron. Maj., II, 586 (where Wendover omits the words ‘in England’); and F. M. Powicke, 
‘The bull “Miramum plurimum” and a letter to Archbishop Stephen Langton’, E.H.R. 44 
(1929), 92, for letters of papal commissioners excommunicating Robert ‘qui exercitus Dei se 
nominat marescallum’.  Note also Cheney (1976), pp. 373-4. 
45 Holt (1992), pp. 226, 295-6, 346 [=Holt (1965), pp. 139, 200].  
46 For Wendover later projecting crusading ideas onto a proposed invasion of England by 
Philip Augustus in 1212, see Chron. Maj., II, 536-7; Cheney (1948a) demonstrates that 
Wendover’s account of these events is not to be trusted.  
47 Rot. Litt. Claus., I, 165.  See below, p. 000.  
48 Selected Letters of Innocent III, pp. 133, 161; Rot. Litt. Pat., p. 101; F. M. Powicke & C. R. 
Cheney, Councils and Synods (Oxford, 1964), I, 34.  
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the Charter and in the beneficiaries mentioned in its first clause, passages that had not 
appeared in the Articles of the Barons: 
Know that we, from reverence of God and for the salvation of our soul and those of 
all our ancestors and heirs, for the honour of God and the exaltation of the Holy 
Church and the reform of our realm … in the first place have granted to God and by 
this our present charter have confirmed, for us an our heirs in perpetuity, that the 
English Church shall be free. 
Stephen Langton and Theology 
The Continental context within which Magna Carta has been discussed was not just political, 
and the book that Holt was reviewing in 2003 – Natalie M. Fryde, Why Magna Carta? 
Angevin England Revisited (Münster 2001) – has turned out, at least in one respect, to be 
prophetic. Fryde sought to resurrect Powicke’s case, refuted by Holt, that Stephen Langton 
was the principal ideologue on the baronial side, that the archbishop applied the formidable 
book-learning of a Parisian university theologian to developing the case against John.49 She 
argued that the most important theoretical influence on Langton was John of Salisbury, a 
view which has failed to find general favour. Yet although she did not know it, her renewed 
attribution of influence to Langton chimed in with a recent attempt, by Philippe Buc, to tease 
political lessons out of the scriptural commentaries and quaestiones of twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century theologians, including the colossal corpus of (largely) unedited 
manuscripts of Langton’s scriptural and other commentaries.50 That Langton was only one 
amongst many theologians considered in Buc’s book, that it concentrated on his writings 
prior to his election as archbishop of Canterbury, that it failed even to mention Magna Carta, 
and that it was published in French, might all help to account for the tardiness of its impact 
on Anglophone scholarship relating to 1215. The honourable exception was David d’Avray, 
who quickly sketched the possible implications for Magna Carta, although he largely 
                                                          
49 Fryde (1998) was a trial run for ch. VIII of her book. 
50 Buc (1994), pp. 43, 62, 66, 79, 99-101, 138-9, 143-5, 157, 168, 182, 187-93, 198, 251-2, 
282-3, 294, 321, 329, 348-50, 361, 390-2; his ‘Principes gentium dominantur eorum: 
Princely Power between Legitimacy and Illegitimacy in Twelfth-Century Exegesis’, in T.N. 
Bisson, ed., Cultures of Power. Lordship, Status, and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe 
(Philadelphia, PA 1995), pp. 310-28, summarised part of the book, but made only passing 
reference to Langton. For Langton’s works, see R. Sharpe, A Handlist of Latin Writers of 




confined his observations to Langton’s role in the reissue of 1225. He did so because he 
considered only the views on royal taxation which Langton had expressed in his academic 
writings, and the reissue of 1225 was granted in return for the grant of a fifteenth of moveable 
wealth, whereas the original of 1215 had not been issued in return for any sort of levy.51 
Nevertheless, d’Avray clearly signalled that this approach to Langton’s role as an intellectual 
in English politics had potentially wider implications. For instance, he followed Buc in 
emphasising the importance to Langton of I Samuel 10: 24, 25, where Samuel proclaimed the 
‘law of the kingdom’ to Saul after Saul’s acclamation as king, and ‘inscribed it in a book, 
which he deposited in the presence of the Lord.’ According to Langton, this law was to be 
identified with that in Deuteronomy 17. It provided the people’s best bulwark against the 
wicked exercise of kingship.52 It was pregnant parallels of this kind which led d’Avray to 
express the hope that ‘this article will draw the attention of Magna Carta specialists to 
[Buc’s] book.’53 Perhaps it prompted Nicholas Vincent to notice the contrast which Langton 
drew between the kings of ancient Israel, such as Josiah, who took heed of the book of the 
law recorded in Deuteronomy, going so far as to rend his garments in anguished penitence, 
and modern kings who, if they bothered to listen to the word of God at all, did so only once a 
year, and slipped out of church before the sermon had even ended.54 As with most of 
Langton’s extant works, this commentary cannot be dated with any precision, so it is 
impossible to suggest which particular modern kings Langton might have had in mind. 
Elsewhere he denounced an (unnamed) English king for indulging so enthusiastically in the 
English national pastime of drunkenness that after dinner he was incapable not only of taking 
counsel, but even of speech.55 
It was John Baldwin, unsurprisingly a specialist on the twelfth-century Parisian 
schools rather than English political history, who first took up d’Avray’s invitation,56 and 
presented Langton as a latter-day Samuel. He laid particular emphasis on the influence of 
Langton’s probable tutor, Peter the Chanter, on his putative pupil. Peter would have imbued 
                                                          
51 D’Avray (1997); cf. Buc (1994), pp. 260-72. 
52 For Langton’s comments, see d’Avray (1997), 427-9, 437-8; Buc (1994), pp. 282-3. 
53 D’Avray (1994), 426 n. 9. 
54 Stephen Langton, Commentary on the Book of Chronicles, ed. A. Saltman (Ramat-Gan 
1978), p. 200, discussed by Vincent (2010), p. 75; P.A. Linehan, ‘Historiografia peninsular: 
el intellectual en la politica’, Actas XL Semana de Estudios Medievales, 2013: La Cultura en 
la Europa del siglo XIII, 2014 (Pamplona 2014), pp. 285-301, at 289. 
55 On Leviticus 10: 9: B. Smalley, ‘Exempla in the Commentaries of Stephen Langton’, 
Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XVII (1933), 121-129, at 126.  
56 Baldwin (2008). 
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Langton with the type of views which he indeed expressed – views which might be 
characterized as ‘anti-monarchical’.57 What this meant was a darkly Augustinian reading of 
the Old Testament account of the institution of kingship in Israel, granted by God to the 
Israelites in his wrath, and grounded in sin, but as such also a partial, providential remedy for 
sin.58 The most important immediate source for these views was Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences.59 On these foundations Langton had occasionally gone so far as to suggest that the 
commands of a wicked king were not always to be obeyed. In certain circumstances subjects 
were not only obliged to disobey a legitimate king who ordered something unjust,60 they must 
take action to thwart him. If, for instance, the king sought to kill someone unjustly and 
without any judgement having been passed in a court (sine sententia),61 then those who were 
aware of the circumstances were obliged to liberate the potential victim.62 It was the necessity 
of a judgement in court which was the decisive criterion for Langton.63 If a king waged an 
unjust war, but on the basis of a judgement passed by a court, then his men must obey him 
even though the judgement was unjust. If a king besieged a castle in accordance with a 
judgement, however unjust, passed in court, then the people must not disobey him; if no 
judgement had been pronounced, then the people would not be disobedient if it failed to obey 
him.64 These opinions are gathered from widely disparate bits of casuistry in Langton’s huge 
corpus of commentaries; as is conventional in scholastic works of this kind, he did not 
expound them systematically or at length. And he obviously advances them at a high level of 
abstruseness – although, as Baldwin and others observe, contemporary events occasionally 
break into the theoretical ivory tower,65 as they doubtless did as asides in Langton’s 
                                                          
57 Baldwin (2008), 813. 
58 Baldwin (2008), 813; see Langton on I Sam. 10: 24, cf. Os 13: 11, quoted by Buc (1994), 
p. 253 n. 39. Buc, pp. 356-67, detects ‘democratic tendencies’ in Peter the Chanter’s 
justification for popular action against King David. 
59 Buc (1994), pp. 138-9. 
60 Baldwin (2008), 815. 
61 In contemporary canon law, sententia meant the binding decision of a court, or what is 
termed judgement in modern English: see, for instance, Corpus iuris canonici, Liber extra (= 
X) 2. 27. This might be synonymous with iudicium, but iudicium might also mean the whole 
judicial process rather than just its outcome. Much the same had been true in classical Roman 
law: A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia, PA 1953), s.v.. I 
should like to thank Magnus Ryan for his guidance on this nuance. 
62 Baldwin (2008), 817-18. 
63 Already noticed by Powicke (1928), pp. 94-5; Roberts (1968), pp. 123-30. 
64 Baldwin (2008), 818. 
65 Baldwin (2008), 818: ‘The king of the French has an unjust war with the king of England, 
and I am his knight…’; Langton’s gloss on Amos 7: 10-13, concerning a modern bishop 
exiled like Amos: ‘Leave my bishopric…, go back to your studies in Paris…Your rebukes 
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university lectures. Nevertheless, it seems clear that for Langton what mattered most was that 
a judgement had been handed down in a court, regardless of whether that judgement was just 
or not, and without any attempt to define either the nature of the particular court or of the 
procedures followed in it. 
Having distilled this principle out of Langton’s theological writings, Baldwin attempts 
to present it – ‘Master Stephen’s personal signature’ – as the basis of the opposition’s case 
against John. Specifically, he argues that the principle was embodied in the first clause of the 
second half of the so-called Unknown Charter – the half which supplemented what was in 
this document termed Henry I’s Coronation Charter66 – and which appears to be the earliest 
detailed extant draft of the opposition’s demands: ‘King John grants that he will not take any 
man without judgement, nor will he accept anything for justice, nor will he do any 
injustice.’67 This is the only item in the second half of the Unknown Charter which records a 
grant already made by the king; all the other clauses are prospective grants by John, mostly 
expressed (like the preceding Coronation Charter of Henry I) in the first, rather than the 
opening clause’s third, person singular. Those who are inclined to date the Unknown Charter 
to 1215 have long interpreted this first clause as probably referring to the grant offered by 
John which is recorded in letters patent of 10 May, in the drafting of which Langton is likely 
to have played some part.68 On the very same day John also offered the judgement of his 
court to both Geoffrey de Mandeville for the fine Geoffrey had made for his wife, Isabella of 
Angoulême, and to Giles de Briouze, bishop of Hereford, for the fine he had made for the 
lands of his father.69 By 1 April, the pope himself was archly turning the usage against the 
English barons, pointing out to them that they should not attempt to deprive John of 
possession of his traditional scutage ‘without judgement; for he himself, while continuing in 
possession of it, is prepared to offer justice to all petitioners.’70  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
offend the king…’; B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 3rd edn. (Oxford 
1983), p. 252. 
66 What had in the early twelfth century been termed an ‘edict’ was first unambiguously 
referred to as a charter in this document: G. Garnett, Conquered England: Kingship, 
Succession, and Tenure 1066-1166 (Oxford 2007), pp. 105-6. 
67 Cap. 1, below, p. 427; Baldwin (2008), 829, translates this clause rather differently. As 
pointed out below, p. 418, the extant witness is evidently the work of a French scribe, who 
made several mistakes in copying what was in front of him. 
68 Galbraith (1948), pp. 133-4; below, pp. 234, 420-3 (for the various dates proposed), 492-3. 
69 Rot. Litt. Pat., p. 141. 
70 Selected Letters of Innocent III, no. 77, p. 202; cf. below, p. 231. 
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But as Baldwin went on to concede, its invention cannot be credited to Langton. Nor 
was it (just) rarified book-learning. It was a well-established legal commonplace.71 It was, for 
instance, intrinsic to the terms of the assize of novel disseisin.72 According to that chronicler 
of late twelfth-century rustic lore Gerald of Wales, Roger of Asterby, a Lincolnshire knight, 
had had a vision of King Henry II’s being instructed in the principle by both St Peter and the 
Archangel Gabriel.73 According to Roger of Howden, in 1191 the future King John and King 
Richard’s Chancellor William de Longchamps had agreed that henceforth no-one who held 
freely would be disseised by the ‘will’ of royal officials, but ‘by judgement of the court of the 
lord king according to the lawful customs and assizes of the realm’.74 It was interpolated into 
the copy of the Leges Henrici made in the compilation of the Leges Anglorum put together in 
London sometime shortly after 1204.75 It seems to have underpinned the pope’s proposals for 
a formal settlement on 19 March, when he commended it to the king as he would two weeks 
later to the rebellious barons.76 Langton had frequently repeated it in theological contexts, but 
there is no reason why its appearance at the head of the second part of the Unknown Charter 
should be attributed to his influence, whatever role he may have played in the letters patent of 
10 May. Indeed, as David Carpenter has pointed out in a response to Baldwin’s essay, the 
lack of interest shown in ecclesiastical matters in the second part of the Unknown Charter 
strongly suggests that Langton was not closely involved in drafting this list of demands on 
King John, whenever they were drafted.77 Much the same, he suggests, is true of the Articles 
of the Barons,78 which included two clauses analogous to the initial one of the second part of 
the Unknown Charter. Langton’s central role in negotiations from the time of his return to 
England in 1213, as emphasized by Roger of Wendover, does not mean that he was 
responsible for the primary and principal concession recorded as an established fact in the 
Unknown Charter, recast and elaborated in the Articles of the Barons caps. 29, 30, and 
reformulated again in Magna Carta caps. 39, 40. ‘Master Stephen’s personal signature’ was 
in truth nothing of the kind; it was a familiar, conventional refrain, which Langton had picked 
                                                          
71 Baldwin (2008), 836-7, cf. below, pp. 75-8; and for Langton’s insisting on it in proceedings 
against the Northerners in 1213, 220. 
72 Glanvill, lib. xiii cap. 32, 33, pp. 167-8. 
73 Gerald of Wales, De principis instructione, in Opera Omnia, ed. J.S. Brewer, J.F. Dimock, 
and G.F. Warner, eds., 8 vols., Rolls Series (1861-91), VIII, 183-6.  
74 Howden III, 136, discussed below, pp. 120-1; that ‘the mandate of the lord king’ was an 
alternative to judgement shows that things had moved on by 1215. 
75 LHP 8. 1b, Gesetze, I, 554 n. d, discussed by Liebermann (1913), 732-45, at 740. 
76 Below, pp. 229-31, 233-4, 446; Selected Letters of Innocent III, p. 195. 
77 Carpenter (2011), 1041-65, at 1049-50. 
78 Carpenter (2011), 1044-6. 
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up and echoed from time to time in his academic work. When in August 1215 he refused to 
surrender Rochester Castle to John nisi per iudicium, he may perhaps have recalled wryly 
what he had written (probably) many years before about a notional king who besieges a castle 
‘on his own whim [proprio motu]’, rather than because it had been ‘adjudged by a judgement 
[sententia]’.79 But in doing so he had been saying nothing original or unusual. As we shall 
see, the bits of Magna Carta which can with any confidence be pinned on Langton are 
precisely those concerned with the Church, and these are absent from the Articles and the 
second half of the Unknown Charter. Their draftsmen are likely to have had Pope Innocent’s 
recent letters, and the king’s proposals of 10 May, at the forefront of their minds, rather than 
the archbishop’s occasional reiterations of a commonplace in his academic writings. 
Ius commune and Legal Knowledge 
If Langton’s theology may be discounted as a major influence on opposition thinking, what 
of that other great twelfth-century university subject, the learned law or ius commune, both 
canon and Roman? This is a possibility which has recently been explored with great 
thoroughness by Richard Helmholz, and reportedly rejected by Holt.80 That contemporary 
canon law required there to be a court hearing and formal sentence before an 
excommunication does not amount to evidence of canonical influence on Magna Carta cap. 
39 (and, by inference, on the opening clause of the supplementary part of the Unknown 
Charter).81 The subject matter is too different. This principle is in any case common to many 
legal systems, as both Helmholz and Baldwin conceded.82 Helmholz pointed out that even if 
                                                          
79 Baldwin (2008), 818 n. 26, quoting Quaestiones, Cambridge, St John’s College MS 57, fo. 
136v; Coggeshall, pp. 173; Galbraith (1948), p. 137; I.W. Rowlands, ‘King John, Stephen 
Langton and Rochester Castle’, in C. Harper-Bill, C. Holdsworth, and J.L. Nelson, eds., 
Studies in Medieval History presented to R. Allen Brown (Woodbridge 1989), pp. 267-79. 
80 Helmholz (1999), 297 n., reports that Holt ‘did not find the Article’s argument 
convincing’; see also below, pp. 284-6. Professor Helmholz kindly informs us that Holt 
discussed the question with him on one occasion, and that Holt recalled having discussed it 
with Christopher Cheney. Both Holt and Cheney had come to the conclusion that there was 
no evidence to support the case. Given Cheney’s knowledge of canon law, his reported 
opinion is particularly authoritative. Holt’s thoughts are set out at greater length in a long 
letter to Helmholz, dated 1 February 1997, which comments on a draft of the essay. This is 
now lodged with Holt’s papers in the Department of Mediaeval History, St Andrews 
University. 
81 Helmholz (1999), 357, citing X. 2. 28. 26. 
82 Helmholz (1999), 357 n. 228; Baldwin (2008), 836 and n. 77. For Langton’s commentary 
on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, see J.W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants. The 




Langton were not a competent learned lawyer himself, other members of his household 
would have been.83 What he does not say is that they would have been competent not just as 
canonists, but also, perforce, as practitioners of contemporary English law. Otherwise they 
would scarcely have been capable of dealing with the quotidian, practical interests of their 
churches.  
Although the distinction between the two categories of law was readily acknowledged 
– Ralph Niger (unusually) expressed hostility to the ius commune84 – they were not 
impermeably distinct. That is clear from Glanvill, which opens with a conscious literary 
aping of Roman grandiloquence85 to lend the book jurisprudential respectability, as it were. 
Yet elsewhere Glanvill made a point of differentiating itself from the language of the learned 
law: it professed to be written ‘intentionally in a vulgar style, with words used in court’ in 
order to explain English procedures to those ‘who are not at all versed in this type of 
vulgarity’.86 The Dialogus de Scaccario likewise conceded that English royal documents – 
the document under discussion being Domesday Book – were written in ‘common words’, 
but described the Book’s purpose in impeccably Romanesque terms: ‘that every man should 
be content with his right, and might not encroach with impunity on that of another.’87 Both 
authors, writing in the 1170s or 1180s, seem slightly embarrassed by the vulgarity of the 
language of English law, as if potential, legally-knowledgeable readers might consider it 
barbarous. In other words, they assume a certain proficiency in the ius commune – and 
anticipate a concomitant snootiness – on the part of those readers. As Richard fitz Neal’s 
lengthy digression on the subject of Domesday Book reveals, they were determined to signal 
                                                          
83 Helmholz (1999), 361; cf. Acta Stephani Langton Cantuariensis archiepiscopi A.D. 1207-
1228, ed. K. Major, Canterbury and York Society, L (London 1950), nos. 13, 83; K. Major, 
‘The Familia of Archbishop Stephen Langton’, E.H.R., XLVIII (1933), 529-53, at 530, 
identifies William of Bardney and Adam of Tilney as perhaps the ‘iurisperiti’ mentioned by 
Langton in passing a judgement in favour of the abbot of Pershore. For these and other 
possible candidates, see Brundage (2010), in Loengard, ed. (2010), p. 96. 
84 Ralph Niger, ‘Moralia regum’, in H. Kantorowicz and B. Smalley, ‘An English 
Theologian’s View of Roman Law: Pepo, Irnerius, Ralph Niger’, Medieval  and Renaissance 
Studies, L (1941-3), 237-52, at 250-2; E. Rathbone, ‘Roman Law in the Anglo-Norman 
Realm’, Studia Gratiana, XI (1967), 253-71, at 256-7, 269; F. de Zulueta and P. Stein, The 
Teaching of Roman Law in England around 1200, Selden Society, supplementary series VIII 
(London 1990), pp. xli-xliii. 
85 Glanvill, prologus, p. 2. 
86 Glanvill, prologus, p. 3. 
87 Dialogus I. xvi; cf. Roger of Howden’s account of the words used on behalf of John 
immediately after his accession in 1199, which echo Dig. 1. 1. 10: Hoveden IV, 88. It seems 
likely that this is evidence of Howden’s learning, but Howden was a royal justice. 
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that they shared that proficiency (if not the snootiness) themselves. Most capable lawyers – 
particularly, one suspects, clerical lawyers – would have had to be competent in both types of 
law. And the ius commune’s influence on English law was not restricted to matters of style or 
vocabulary. For instance, Glanvill’s content is in one case demonstrably shaped by Roman 
law;88 in another the author explicitly distinguishes between the rules of English law and 
those of the ius commune.89 But in general there is more evidence of awareness of Romano-
canonical parallels than of the learned law’s direct influence on English procedure.90 
Widespread knowledge of Roman and canon law in England does not, however, mean 
that they had a profound influence on most of Magna Carta, whether via Langton’s backroom 
boys or any other route. The only published response thus far to Helmholz’s essay 
demonstrates that his alleged parallels between ius commune texts and Magna Carta may 
chiefly be attributed to the occasional use in the Charter of Romano-canonical vocabulary.91 
This does not have to have come direct from those texts: it might, for instance, have come 
from the Vulgate, which, as the work of an accomplished Roman lawyer, is shot through with 
Roman legal terminology;92 and, not least because it had scriptural warrant, it might already 
have become embedded in English law long before 1215.93 The only clauses of Magna Carta 
which are indubitably influenced by canon law are those which concern the Church: most 
importantly, the general clause with which the Charter opened, and more detailed provisions, 
such as cap. 22, on amercement of clerics.94 It was precisely in these clauses that Langton can 
be shown to have had his greatest influence. Thus, for instance, cap. 1 was newly framed for 
Magna Carta: it had no precedent in the Articles of the Barons, drafted, without any 
                                                          
88 Glanvill lib. x c. 3 p. 118, cf. Nov. 4. 3. 1, as shown by Hudson (2010), in Loengard, ed. 
(2010), pp. 104-5, which provides a critique of Helmholz (1999). Helmholz has responded 
briefly, in the prolegomenon to an Italian version of this essay: Helmholz (2012), pp. 23-7. 
89 Glanvill lib. vii, c. 15, p. 88, cited by Hudson (2010), p. 117. 
90 M.G. Cheney, ‘Possessio/proprietas in Ecclesiastical Courts in Mid-Twelfth-Century 
England’, in G. Garnett and J.G.H. Hudson, eds., Law and Government in Medieval England 
and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt (Cambridge 1994), pp. 245-54 
91 Hudson (2010), pp. 101, 108-10. Brundage (2010), pp. 95-9, is more sympathetic to 
Helmholz.  
92 Hudson (2010), pp. 108, 118-9; more generally W. Ullmann, ‘The Bible and Principles of 
Government in the Middle Ages’, repr. in his The Church and the Law in the Earlier Middle 
Ages (London 1975), ch. III. 
93 Eg., the law of debt in Glanvill, above n. 40; Hudson (2010), p. 105; for an earlier example, 
see B.C. Brasington, ‘Canon Law in the Leges Henrici Primi’, Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, cxxiii, kanonistische Abteilung, XCII (2006), 288-305. 
94 Helmholz (1999), 311-14, 329-31; Hudson (2010), pp. 102-3. 
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detectable input from the archbishop, a few days beforehand.95 (That the document eventually 
fell into his hands does not mean that he had influenced its contents).96 His chief contribution 
to Magna Carta appears to have lain in the insertion at its head of this guarantee of the liberty 
of the ecclesia Anglicana, specifically freedom of election, which, as the clause made clear, 
John had granted previously.97 It was scarcely conceivable that such a provision would bear 
no traces of canon law.  
Yet although there is no precedent in the Articles, there is one, or at least a partial one, 
in Henry I’s Coronation Charter, which formed the first half of the Unknown Charter. In its 
opening clause Henry I had proclaimed ‘First of all (in primis), I make the Holy Church of 
God free’. Magna Carta cap. 1 states: ‘First of all (in primis) [we] have conceded to God and 
by this our present charter have confirmed, for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English 
Church should be free…’ The nature of the principal freedom granted is different: in 1100, it 
was an undertaking that church lands and resources would not be plundered while they were 
in the king’s custody during a vacancy; in 1215, it was freedom of election. But the earlier 
royal charter to which Magna Carta explicitly refers, first issued in November 1214, reissued 
in January 1215, and (as Magna Carta also records) subsequently confirmed by the pope, 
does not use that little phrase in primis. It is an unusual phrase: it is not found, for instance, in 
either of King Stephen’s Charters of Liberties, or in that of Henry II. It is difficult not to 
believe that whoever drafted cap. 1 of Magna Carta was recalling Henry I’s Charter, where 
the phrase also marks off the grant of liberty to a single ‘Holy Church of God’ as distinct 
from concessions about the incidents of feudal tenure (and other matters) in subsequent 
clauses.98 The final sentence of cap. 1 of Magna Carta emphasises even more strongly that 
the preceding, inserted grant to the single ‘English Church’99 (the term used in John’s 
charters of November 1214 and January 1215) is distinct from the liberties granted in the rest 
                                                          
95 Carpenter (2011), 1044-7. 
96 Below, p. 245. 
97 Carpenter (2011), 1050-3; John had issued a charter to this effect on 21 November 1214, 
which had been reissued (for reasons which remain unclear) in identical terms on 15 January 
1215, at a council in London: Selected Letters of Innocent III, pp. 198-201; Cheney (1976), 
pp. 363-5. 
98 In this respect they are quite different from the Charters of either Stephen or Henry II. 
Stephen’s first Charter makes no mention of the Church; his second is almost exclusively 
concerned with the Church. Henry II’s Charter integrates pledges about future treatment of 
the Church throughout. 
99 Though note that in the contemporary French translation ‘les yglises d’ Engleterre’ are 
consistently in the plural: Holt (1974) repr. in Holt (1985a), p. 250. 
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of the document: ‘We have also granted [Concessimus eciam]…’ Although cap. 1 of Magna 
Carta may include canonical terminology which was unavoidable in such a context, therefore, 
it also echoes both the phrasing and the arrangement of an earlier English royal document 
which had for some time provided the formal foundation for the opposition’s case against 
John. If the clause may indeed be attributed to Langton, the verbal echo provides the 
diplomatic connection between him and Henry I’s Charter100 which has hitherto eluded those 
who, following Roger of Wendover and Powicke, have attributed its resurrection to him. The 
echo does not, however, establish that Langton was responsible for that resurrection: the 
valiant efforts made in recent publications to overturn or at least modify Holt’s judgement 
about the unreliability of Roger of Wendover’s account of events in St Paul’s Cathedral on 25 
August 1213 have not been successful.101 There is reliable evidence that on that occasion he 
preached against English drunkenness102 – something of a personal obsession. There is none 
to support the rumour reported by Roger of his producing Henry I’s Coronation Charter in 
private discussion with the barons. There was nothing in Langton’s background to make him 
a likely expert in antique English royal records, or for that matter in recent developments in 
English law, though it is, of course, perfectly possible that members of his household were 
more knowledgeable, and certain that by June 1215 he had become very familiar with Henry 
I’s Charter. But profound as was the influence of Henry I’s Charter throughout Magna Carta, 
the legal intelligence which informed the drafting in 1215 had moved far beyond that of the 
draftsman of 1100. To cite just two (connected) instances: the emphasis on perpetuity which 
appears in cap. 1, whence (in Holt’s phrase) it ‘infected all the rest’ of the document;103 and 
that on corporate personality, in the form of ‘the commune of the whole land’ (cap. 61), the 
perpetual recipient of the liberties granted. As Holt shows, these are a product of intervening 
developments in the exercise of royal government; but as he also suggests, it is here that the 
indirect influence of canon law might most profitably be sought, in broadly conceptual, not 
detailed textual, terms.104  
                                                          
100 Carpenter (2011), 1052, notices the echo, but does not draw this connection. 
101 Baldwin (2008), 827-31, Fryde, (2001), pp. 79, 95; Vincent (2010), 93-7; cf. below, pp. 
224-5, 268-71, 280-7, and Carpenter (2011), 1047-8, endorsing Holt’s view. 
102 G. Lacombe, ‘An Unpublished Document of the Great Interdict (1207-1213)’, Catholic 
Historical Review, n.s., XV (1930), 408-20; P. B. Roberts, ed., Selected Sermons of Stephen 
Langton (Toronto 1980), pp. 35-51; Baldwin (2008), 825-7.  
103 Below, p. 518, cf. p. 285. 
104 Below, pp. 285-6; Holt (1991a), esp. 4-6.  
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Thus, for instance, the interpolations made in the recension of the Leges Edwardi 
Confessoris found in the London Collection of the Leges Anglorum – the key compilation for 
opposition thinking in the city – repeatedly mention commune consilium.105 There is no need 
to attribute this to direct canonical influence. It was already present in the opening clause of 
Henry I’s Coronation Charter, which was included in the Collection. More parochially, it may 
reflect the city’s ‘common counsel’, probably identical with the body of twenty-four which 
swore in 1205-6 to ‘counsel according to its custom by right of the lord king’, 106 and the seal 
of which is referred to in a list of city charters copied in the Collection.107 Corona is a 
comparable example, even more frequently invoked in the interpolations in the Leges 
Edwardi Confessoris.108 It might appear to be a perfect example of the sort of juristic 
abstraction characteristic of the more modish innovations of the learned law;109 but there was 
by this point a century-long, indigenous tradition of using the word in a non-physical sense, 
and in origin this owed nothing to the ius commune.110 In 1215 both concepts may have been 
considerably enriched by the recent sophistications of the learned law. The ‘crown’ of the 
interpolations in the Leges Edwardi was no longer merely a metonym. The commune of 
London and its epoch-making offspring the ‘commune of the whole land’ – the Charter’s 
beneficiary and the key to its security111 – was a novel secular abstraction of a type seen 
elsewhere in twelfth-century European cities. But in both cases it is easy to detect earlier 
indigenous antecedents, and impossible to demonstrate specific influences from the learned 
law, as distinct from general similarities.   
                                                          
105 LECf 32 A 4, 32 B 1, 32 C 4, 32 E 6: Gesetze, I, 655, 656, 658, 660, cf. 11, 1 A 8, 32 B 8, 
32 C 7. The earliest version of the Collection – the only one dating from the thirteenth 
century – survives in Manchester, John Rylands Library MS Lat. 155 and London, BL MS 
Add. 14252 (originally a single manuscript); further, Liebermann (1913), and on the second 
section which is composed of municipal documents, Bateson (1902). For a more thorough 
survey of the material relating to London, see Weinbaum (1933), II, 1-91. 
106 BL MS Add. 14252, fo. 110r; Weinbaum (1933), II, 49-50; Keene (2008), 88; Helmholz 
(1999), 322-4. For analogous examples in the Collection, see the building assise of 1212, MS. 
Add. 14252, fo. 128r (Bateson (1902), 729-30; Weinbaum (1933), II, 89), and the communal 
oath of Richard I’s reign, fos. 112v-113r (Bateson (1902), 510-11; Weinbaum (1933), II, 57). 
107 BL MS Add. 14252, fo. 106r; Weinbaum (1933), II, 45. 
108 LECf 13, 1 A, 32 A 4, , 32 B, 32 B 1, 32 C 3, 32 C 7, 32 E, 32 E 3, 35, 1 A 1; Gesetze, I, 
640, 655, 656, 658, 659, 660, 664. 
109 For instance, E.H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political 
Theology (Princeton, NJ 1957), pp. 149-87, 342-64.  
110 Garnett (1996).  
111 The identical phrase is used in the Articles cap. 49. 
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Langton and his household were not the only possible source of the various types of 
legal acumen apparent in Magna Carta. As Holt repeated in the book review of 2003, the 
Chapter of St Paul’s was a hotbed of learned clerical radicals such as Gervase of Howbridge 
(or Heybridge), its chancellor, who was almost certainly brother of William of Howbridge, 
one of the rebels of 1215. Gervase had been involved in Robert fitz Walter’s conspiracy 
against John in 1212, and had been briefly exiled.112 His election as dean sometime between 
September 1215 and June 1216 suggests the attitude of the majority the Chapter towards the 
king by that point.113 Simon Langton, the archbishop’s brother (and possibly chancellor of 
Canterbury), was also amongst many other things a canon of St Paul’s.114 William of Ely, 
who became king’s treasurer in succession to Richard fitz Neal, by then bishop of London 
(1198-98), was made a canon by his consanguineus,115 the bishop. In 1215 he went over to 
the rebel side.116 He is a reminder that many members of the St Paul’s Chapter had been 
senior mandarins, and that in the end this did not necessarily make for loyalty to John, whose 
activities some royal justices had found it difficult to stomach long before the debacle of 
1215.117 As the case of Bishop Richard underlines, they were a learned lot: Ralph de Diceto 
(d. 1199/1200), a Parisian-trained lawyer as well as an accomplished historian, had recently 
been dean.118 And this was true not only of the canons. Thomas of Chobham, a canon lawyer, 
was a member of Bishop Richard’s household;119 Peter of Blois, of that of Bishop William de 
Ste Mère-Eglise, Richard’s successor.120 Peter might have expressed regret for his youthful 
enthusiasm for Roman law, but at Bologna he had sat at the feet of no less an authority on the 
subject than the future Pope Urban III.121 On a more workaday level, it is possible to identify 
several jobbing attorneys who acted for the bishop, and were members of his household.122 
                                                          
112 Below, p. 283; Richardson (1933), 252-3; Holt (1961), p. 94. 
113 E.E.A., XXVI: London 1189-1228, ed. D.P. Johnson (Oxford 2003), pp. lvii, 219. 
114 John le Neve, Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1066-1300, ed. D.E. Greenway et al., 9 vols. 
(London 1968-2003), I, 50; Acta Stephani Langton, pp. xlix-l (for his acting as his brother’s 
chancellor, and possibly drafting documents in a particularly uncompromising style); Holt 
(1985c), in Holt (1985a), pp. 1-22, at 16; Holt, (1991a), p. 5. 
115 E.E.A., XXVI, no. 74. 
116 H.G. Richardson, ‘William of Ely, the King’s Treasurer’, T.R.H.S., 4th ser., XV (1932), 
45-90, at 48-9, 56-8; E.E.A., XXVI, pp. xxxix, xlix, li-liii. 
117 Hudson (2012), pp. 846-7. 
118 E.E.A., XXVI, pp. xliv-xlv; J.F.A. Mason, ‘Ralph of Diceto’, O.D.N.B.; D.E. Greenway, 
‘Historical Writing at St Paul’s’, in D. Keene, A. Burns, and A. Saint, eds. (2004), pp. 151-3. 
119 E.E.A., XXVI, pp. liv-lv. 
120 E.E.A., XXVI, pp. lv-lvi. 
121 R.W. Southern, ‘Peter of Blois’, O.D.N.B. 
122 E.E.A., XXVI, pp. xli-xliii. 
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Close to the beginning of the twelfth century, it was probably there that one of the first 
antiquarian collections of Old English laws – Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS 383 – 
had been put together,123 perhaps at the instigation of Bishop Maurice of London, the 
sometime royal chancellor.124 If it had not been assembled there, it seems certain that it was 
there soon afterwards when a copy of a list of shipmen owed by St Paul’s from its estates c. 
1000 was added.125 Yet later surviving booklists from St Paul’s library provide no direct 
evidence that the church continued to be a centre of jurisprudential scholarship during the 
twelfth century, whether in English or learned law,126 much though one might suspect it, 
given the presence there of the likes of Richard fitz Neal. The London Collection of the Leges 
Anglorum has not been identified as a St Paul’s manuscript; its generally secular interests 
might be judged to make such an identification unlikely,127 and Liebermann considered that it 
was written ‘for the London Guildhall.’128 But given the central role of St Paul’s in the life of 
the city – pictorially represented on the seal of the barons of London of c. 1220,129 and of St 
                                                          
123 F. Liebermann, ‘Matrosenstellung aus Landgutern der Kirche London’, Archiv für 
Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, CIV (1900), 17-24; Wormald (1999a), pp. 
228-36, with St Paul’s provenance established, and St Paul’s composition suggested, at 230, 
234. 
124 P. Wormald, ‘Laga Eadwardi: The Textus Roffensis and its Context’, repr. in Wormald 
(1999b), pp. 115-37, at 135; Wormald (1999a), p. 236, who also speculates, p. 230 n. 268, 
that the ‘Master Robert of Abingdon’ recorded in the manuscript in a thirteenth-century hand 
may have been the brother of Archbishop Edmund, and that he might have acquired it 
through his contacts with the Langton family. 
125 CCCC 383, fo. 107; Wormald (1999a), p. 230; P. Taylor, ‘Foundation and Endowment: St 
Paul’s and the English Kingdoms, 604-1087’, in Keene et al., eds. (2004), p. 15. The list is 
edited in S.E. Kelly, ed., Anglo-Saxon Charters, X: Charters of St Paul’s (Oxford 2004), no. 
25. 
126 N.R. Ker, ‘Books at St Paul’s Cathedral before 1313’, in A.E.J. Hollander and W. 
Kellaway, eds., Studies in London History Presented to P.E. Jones (London 1969), pp. 43-72; 
N. L. Ramsay and J. Willoughby, eds., Secular Cathedrals of England and Wales, Corpus of 
Medieval British Library Catalogues (London forthcoming). Bishop Ralph Baldock 
bequeathed a library including works of canon and civil law in 1313: N.L. Ramsay, ‘The 
Library and Archives to 1897’, in Keene et al., eds. (2004), p. 414. It is impossible to be 
certain about items not recorded in these lists, for instance those which might have been lost 
when the cathedral was closed and its property sequestrated in 1642, or in the fire of 1666. 
127 The surviving witness is probably a less than perfect copy of a lost autograph, and it is 
impossible to say whether that putative autograph contained evidence which might have 
linked it to St Paul’s: Liebermann (1913), 744; P. Wormald, ‘Quadripartitus’, repr. in 
Wormald (1999b), pp. 81-114, at 89 n. 29; Keene (2008), 81-2. 
128 Liebermann (1913), 743. 
129 Keene (2008), 77 and fig. 1: note that St Paul’s is central on the obverse, and on the 
miniature cityscape on the reverse, the main function of which is to depict St Thomas Becket. 
Perhaps the seal of the ‘common counsel’, referred to in the London Collection (above, n. 
105), also featured the tower of St Paul’s. 
23 
 
Paul himself ‘in gold, with the feet, and hands, and head in silver, and a sword in hand’ on 
the Mayor’s banner130 – and the expertise of its personnel, it seems unlikely that the canons 
of St Paul’s played no part in the compilation of what became for well over a century the 
definitive London legal compilation. As London’s cathedral, it would have been the 
conventional place in which to deposit engrossments of royal charters sent to the city,131 so 
much of the material which makes up the Collection is likely to have been found there. A 
reference in the Collection to the London folkmoot being summoned by the bell of St Paul’s 
is evocative:132 it met to the north east of the church, by the belfry.133 What is clear is that 
whoever compiled the Collection was not drawing directly on that early twelfth-century 
compilation of Old English law which had probably been assembled at St Paul’s. The fact 
that one part of the Collection shares the arrangement of a block of (anonymous) legal texts 
with the earlier St Paul’s compilation134 suggests only that in this particular instance they 
both drew on a similar source, not that the later one depended on the earlier. The putative role 
of members of the Chapter as legal advisors for the opposition must for the present depend on 
personal connections with Archbishop Stephen Langton and with Robert fitz Walter, lord of 
Baynard’s Castle, ‘the standard bearer of the lord king and procurator of the whole city’,135 
who was also a close associate (and relative) of Saer de Quincy,136 earl of Winchester, baron 
of the Exchequer, and royal judge. De Quincy had attested the grant of freedom to the Church 
in 1214 and was one of the main negotiators on the baronial side in 1215.  He and Robert 
both ended up as members of the Twenty-Five. As Holt pointed out in the book review of 
                                                          
130 Liber Custumarum, in Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, ed. H.T. Riley, 3 vols. in 4 
parts, (RS 1859-62), II, pt. 1, p. 148. 
131 On this practice, see Poole (1913). 
132 BL MS Add 14252, fo. 101r, discussed by Bateson (1902), 502-3; Weinbaum (1933), II, 
39. D. Keene, ‘From Conquest to Capital: St Paul’s c. 1100-1300’, in Keene et al., eds. 
(2004), p. 31, points out that not only was the great assembly of 25 August 1213 held there, 
but it was also there, before the high altar, that John did liege homage to the papal legate on 3 
October 1213.  
133 Keene, ‘Conquest to Capital’, p. 19 fig. 9. 
134 Wormald, ‘Laga Eadwardi’, pp. 123, 128; (1999a), p. 242, who shows, p. 248 and Table 
4.9, that this was also incorporated into Textus Roffensis. As he points out, ‘Laga Eadwardi’, 
p. 122 n. 13, the fact that the Old English royal codes are rearranged in chronological order in 
the London Collection makes it harder to identify the compiler’s sources. 
135 BL MS Add. 14252, fo. 90v, cf. 125r; Bateson (1902), 485-6, cf. 727-8; Weinbaum 
(1933), II, 16, cf. 83; and for Robert’s hereditary role, Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, 
II, pt. 1, p. 147-51. As the account in Liber Custumarum reveals, Robert’s banner was 
different from the Mayor’s, but the Mayor invested Robert with the banner depicting St Paul 
in St Paul’s churchyard: above, n. 130. 
136 Holt (1984b) repr. in Holt (1997), p. 240. 
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2003, Baynard’s Castle was only a short step from the cathedral.137 The portentous title which 
Robert assumed in April 1215 to counter John’s taking of the Cross on 4 March – ‘Marshal of 
the Army of God and Holy Church in England’ – has clerical fingerprints on it,138 though not 
every cleric would find its bombast convincing,139 and there is no reason to identify a St 
Paul’s man as the culprit. There were many other lawyers active on the opposition side who 
had no St Paul’s association – that accomplished draftsman Elias of Dereham, for instance,140 
who distributed numerous copies of Magna Carta to the localities.141 
Key text though the London Collection manifestly is, it cannot be shown to have been 
directly exploited by those who drafted the Unknown Charter, the Articles of the Barons, or 
Magna Carta. Its version of Henry I’s Coronation Charter is derived from Quadripartitus; but 
unlike the copy which prefaces the Unknown Charter, it appears to have been conflated with 
another version, termed by Richard Sharpe the Interpolated Version, which he shows 
circulated widely.142 It also differs from the version translated into Anglo-Norman French in 
a bifolium (also including the first of Stephen’s Charters of Liberties, and Henry II’s, both 
also translated) intended for the briefing of non-Latinate laymen. This has been dated on 
palaeographical grounds to the early thirteenth century, a dating sharpened on circumstantial 
grounds to c. 1215. The Latin text is very closely related to the Interpolated Version, 
specifically to two almost identical copies in a late thirteenth-century Canterbury cartulary, 
                                                          
137 M.D. Lobel, ed., The British Atlas of Historic Towns, III, The City of London from 
Prehistoric Times to c. 1520 (Oxford 1989), ‘City of London c. 1270’. On 22 November 
1214, at the New Temple, he witnessed John’s charter in favour of St Paul’s: M. Gibbs, ed., 
Early Charters of the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, London, Camden Third Ser., LVIII 
(1939), no. 52; Cal. Charter Rolls, I, 154. 
138 Chron. Maj. II, 586; see also above, p. 000. This was the title he used in the agreement 
which he made with John concerning the custody of London, almost certainly on 19 June: see 
Galbraith (1967), 354-5, below, pp. 263-6, 481-3, 490. Whoever devised it restricted the 
Church (singular) to England, as was the case in cap. 1 of Magna Carta. The Barnwell 
chronicler records no such geographical limitation in the terms of the baronial conjuratio 
established in London in January 1215: ‘that they would pledge themselves to sustain the 
house of the Lord and stand fast for the liberty of the Church and the realm’: Walt. Cov. II, 
217-18; below, p. 223. 
139 Innocent III’s view is revealed by the letter of the papal commissioners of 8 September 
which excommunicated the rebel barons: Powicke (1929), 92.   
140 Vincent (2002), pp. 138 n. 53 (legal experience), 140-1 and n. 64 (draftsmanship). 
141 Holt (1964) repr. in Holt (1985a), pp. 285-6; Holt (1982) repr. in Holt (1985a), p. 262; 
Rowlands (2009), 5, 7, 10. 
142 R. Sharpe, Acts of William II and Henry I (Oxford forthcoming; electronic preview 24 
October 2013), pp. 53-4; for the Interpolated Version, see pp. 45-7. The Unknown Charter’s 
copy is derived straight from Quadripartitus, without any apparent conflation with another 
source: Sharpe, pp. 37-8, 40.  
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which were probably copied from a (now lost) single-sheet copy recorded as having once 
been in the Canterbury archive.143 But that does not mean that the bifolium’s text of Henry I’s 
Charter came from a Canterbury source, for, as Sharpe demonstrates, the text found in the 
archiepiscopal register was not unique to Canterbury. It was widely disseminated: the 
supplementary clause’s reference to ‘presentis ecclesie’ could apply to any church. There is, 
therefore, no demonstrable link between the bifolium and the London Collection; and none 
between either of them and St Paul’s. Yet the bifolium’s copy was a pretty careful one,144 
precisely translated.145 It was not a series of jottings. It was evidently executed by competent 
scribes, who may well have used Chancery copies of the documents.146 Its copy of Henry II’s 
Charter is the best one extant.147 Whoever compiled it seems to have been primarily 
interested in Henry I’s Charter, because the Latin text is on the recto of the first folio and the 
French translation on the recto of the second. It was designed for ease of cross-reference 
between text and translation, but – given its failure to separate clauses as the Articles do – by 
someone who read the document aloud to an audience rather than by non-Latinate laymen 
using a crib for themselves. If the bifolium was compiled in London, there were few locations 
where such a level of expertise might have been encountered, St Paul’s being one of them. 
Yet all that can be concluded, as distinct from inferred, from the latest diplomatic scholarship 
is that there were many copies of Henry I’s Charter in circulation in the early years of the 
thirteenth century, and that they were studied intensively – which is what has always been 
                                                          
143 London, BL MS Harley 458, below, pp. 474-7 and plates 4, 5. This includes the 
supplementary cap. 15, distinctive of the Interpolated Version, which confirmed all ’liberties, 
dignities, and royal customs’ previously confirmed to churches by royal charters. On this 
manuscript, see also Holt (1985c) in (1985a), pp. 14-15. Cf. London, Lambeth Palace 
Library, MS 1212, fos. 10rv, 97v-98r; Sharpe, Acts, pp. 10, 45-8; Holt (1964) in (1985a), p. 
286 n. 3. Holt’s suggestions, below p. 424, that the version in the Canterbury register is 
‘similar’ to that in the London Collection, and that ‘[t]his text may stem from Harleian MS 
458’, must therefore be rejected. 
144 In the final sentence of cap. 8 the scribe wrote ‘dampnatus fuerit’. According to the 
edition in the Acts, this reading is unparalleled. All other witnesses read ‘convictus’, which 
someone, probably the original scribe, has inserted over ‘dampnatus’ but without deleting 
‘dampnatus’. This might mean that he was using more than one copy. 
145 Though note that whoever translated Stephen’s Charter and that of Henry II had given up 
by the time he reached the end: the former is dated ‘Apud London’, and the latter ‘A London’ 
(even though the original Latin specifies Westminster).  
146 Below, p. 475 n. 8. Pierre Chaplais took the view, in a letter to Holt dated 20 August 1982, 
that the whole bifolium was the work of a single scribe – an ‘early thirteenth-century joker’ – 
who deliberately disguised his hand, but Holt remained convinced that three or just possibly 
four scribes had contributed: see Holt papers, St Andrews. To our inexpert eyes, everything 
except the translation of Henry I’s Charter looks like the work of one scribe. 
147 Below, p. 476. 
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apparent from the chroniclers, inaccurate though some of the details of their accounts have 
been judged to be.  
The Date of the Charter 
Aside from consideration of the ius commune, the other post-1992 innovation in the 
scholarship of Magna Carta to which Holt drew attention in his book review of 2003 was 
David Carpenter’s suggested re-dating of Magna Carta itself. As Carpenter pointed out, this 
was not simply a point of diplomatic detail: it had considerable implications for interpretation 
of the document.148 Carpenter argues that we should take at face value the statement at the 
end of the final clause of the four surviving engrossments from 1215: ‘Data per manum 
nostrum in prato quod vocatur Ronimed inter Windlesoram et Stanes, quinto decimo Junii, 
anno regni nostri decimo septimo.’149 Holt, by contrast, argues that the (undated) Articles of 
the Barons, which in his view had been sealed on Wednesday 10 June, were accepted as the 
basis for a settlement on Monday 15 June, and that the settlement was eventually reached on 
Friday 19 June, when ‘firm peace’ – a phrase which may be another echo of the opening 
clause of Henry I’s Charter – was made and the barons renewed their homage.150 As 
Carpenter readily concedes, the existing evidence does not admit of an incontrovertible 
verdict on which view is correct, and he advances his hypothesis only with caution.151 He 
endorses Holt’s dating of the Articles, but argues that the final terms of Magna Carta were 
settled on 15 June at Runnymede, when, as recorded just before the date with which cap. 63 
concludes, ‘it has been sworn both ex parte nostra quam ex parte baronum that all the 
aforesaid shall be observed...’152 In Carpenter’s view, this records that small groups of 
negotiators on either side had sworn on behalf of either party, that the king had then ‘given by 
[his] hand’ the draft recording the terms sworn, and that the king had ensured that this was 
immediately engrossed and sealed.153 John was anxious to make it clear that the Charter was 
his last, best offer, made before peace had been settled and homages renewed; he did so, 
Carpenter suggests, in the hope that if his issuing it failed to bounce the mass of his foes into 
                                                          
148 Carpenter (1996a), p. 4. 
149 Cap. 63, below, p. 472; Carpenter (1996a), pp. 1, 5-7. 
150 Rot. Litt. Pat. pp. 143b, 180b, etc. 
151 Carpenter (1996a), p. 3. 
152 Carpenter (1996a), p. 13. 
153 Carpenter (1996a), pp. 4, 5, 13-16. This reconstruction is accepted by Rowlands (2009), 1. 
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accepting what their representatives had negotiated on their behalf as the basis for peace, it 
might at least sow dissension amongst them.154 
It is a powerful and interesting case, mounted with great ingenuity and thoroughness. 
As such, it commanded Holt’s respect: ‘Cheney would have liked this and Galbraith would 
have relished it.’155 Holt did not vicariously dispense Galbraith’s approval lightly: there was 
no higher praise. One reason why he might have taken particular pleasure in the essay was 
the way in which Carpenter integrated Galbraith’s discovery in the Huntington Library of 
what Galbraith considered to be the penultimate draft of Magna Carta, copied at the start of a 
book of early statutes apparently compiled before 1290.156 As Galbraith showed, many details 
in this text are demonstrably subsequent to those in the Articles and antecedent to those in 
Magna Carta. Although a late copy, it is likely to be a pretty accurate one. The scribe’s minor 
errors prove that he was mechanically copying something, rather than making it up.157 The 
document’s dating clause records its having been ‘given by our own hand’ on the same day – 
logically earlier in the day – but ‘apud Windesor’’ rather than on the ‘meadow which is called 
Runnymede between Windsor and Staines’ of the 1215 engrossments.158 Neither Galbraith 
nor Carpenter attempted to draw a connection between this penultimate draft and John’s 
letters patent of 10 June, which had extended the then current truce until the morning of 15 
June.159 Yet this may be the key to the significance of the penultimate draft. 
                                                          
154 Carpenter (1996a), pp. 8, 14. 
155 Personal letter from David Carpenter, April 2014, recalling his discussion of the matter 
with Holt. 
156 Huntington Library, MS H.M. 25782; Galbraith (1967), 346; the document is thus 
described at 352. V.H. Galbraith, ‘A new MS of the Statutes’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 
XXII (1959), 148-51, gives a fuller account of the book at the beginning of which the 
document is copied. 
157 Galbraith (1967), 346-7. 
158 Galbraith (1967), 351; Carpenter (1996a), p. 2; cf. below, pp. 445-6. The document is 
headed ‘Provisiones de Ronnemede scilicet, carta Johannis Regis’, and finishes ‘Expliciunt 
Provisiones de Ronnemede’. But the identification with Runnymede of a document which 
purports to have been issued at Windsor seems likely to have been in the mind of the 
compiler of the book of statutes, rather than in the document which he was copying. 
159 Rot. Litt. Pat. p. 143: ‘usque in diem Lune in crostino Trinitatis mane’; cf. below, pp. 244, 
248. Carpenter (1996a), p. 13, mentions the extension of the safe conduct, but fails to explain 
the significance of its expiring on the morning of 15 June. Holt (1957) repr. in Holt (1985a), 
pp. 221-3, 228-9, suggested that what was envisaged was acceptance or rejection of the 
Articles by the opposition. But when he wrote this, Galbraith had not yet discovered the copy 
of a draft Magna Carta.  
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The king’s punctiliousness indicates that on 10 June he envisaged that something of 
great moment was scheduled to happen in the morning of 15 June. The truce must be 
extended only up to that precise point, and no further. Normally safe conducts terminated at 
the end of a day.160 And whereas earlier safe conducts had related to a few envoys, the scale 
of circulation for the letters of 10 June suggested that a large gathering was envisaged.161 The 
most plausible explanation is that on 10 June the morning of 15 June had already been set as a 
deadline for reaching (or not) some sort of preliminary deal, based on the Articles which the 
king had sealed on 10th. This deal was what was recorded in the draft document as having 
been reached at Windsor on 15 June, and by inference early in the day – in other words, by 
the deadline. If this reconstruction be correct, then it was with the penultimate draft that the 
petition embodied in the Articles was first recast in the form of a charter, as caps. 1 and 49 of 
the Articles had ordained. This happened at Windsor Castle, where the Chancery personnel 
were likely to have remained, and where the draft charter’s place-date indicates that it was 
warranted by the king.162 The inspiration for that recasting may have come from what the 
rebels had, in the Unknown Charter, termed the ‘charter’ of Henry I,163 though the putative 
supplementary concessions – the ‘consequentia’ – attributed to John in that document in late 
1214 or (more likely) early 1215 had not at that time been cast in charter form.164 The 
opposition had long sought to compel John to confirm the charters of liberties of his 
predecessors. The decision about the diplomatic form to be adopted for the document 
embodying the agreement had already been made by 10 June. The implication of the 
extension of the truce was that it had then been envisaged that an agreed text, based on the 
Articles, but in the form of a charter, would be settled (or not) on the morning of 15 June. 
One obvious objection to Carpenter’s case that the final version of Magna Carta as 
extant in the surviving engrossments of 1215 was agreed and issued later that same day at 
Runnymede is the prodigious level of productivity it assumes on the part of draftsmen and 
scribes. It was easy enough for John to move back and forth between the two locations on a 
                                                          
160 For instance, that issued on 8 June in favour of baronial envoys, which had extended to the 
end – ‘ad diem Jovis proximo sequentem completam’ – of 11 June: Rot Litt. Pat. p. 142b. 
161 Below, pp. 244-5. 
162 Galbraith (1967), 352. If this hypothesis be accepted, then Holt’s argument that it was the 
Articles which provided ‘a preliminary settlement to which all who agreed at Runnymede [on 
15 June] were committed’ would require some amendment. But Holt himself in effect 
suggests it as an alternative hypothesis: below, pp. 446, 249, cf. 245. 
163 This was a misnomer, because Henry I’s document did not record a grant to anyone: see 
the discussion cited above, n. 66. 
164 Below, pp. 427-8. 
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daily basis.165 It would have been another matter for the staff of the Chancery, with all their 
paraphernalia, to do likewise. Whether or not they accompanied John on the three-and-a-half 
mile ride to Runnymede on the afternoon of 15 June,166 if the final version of Magna Carta 
was issued there and then they would have to have been capable of taking account of a series 
of detailed agreed amendments consequent on negotiations subsequent to and presumably 
based on the agreement set down in writing earlier in the day at Windsor, and of 
incorporating them into a lengthy revised document. (The Chancery clerk who had written up 
the Articles had left room for just this sort of insertion at several points – indeed the layout of 
this working document was evidently designed to make it very easy to find particular clauses, 
and to amend or amplify some of them. In this respect the Articles are quite different from the 
extant engrossments.)167 It would have made for a very busy afternoon. ‘That any sealed 
engrossment of so elaborate a document as Magna Carta was available on the famous 15 June 
is highly improbable: indeed, virtually impossible.’168   
Be that as it may, Carpenter flags his rendering cap. 63’s ex parte ‘on behalf of’ as 
‘immensely significant’ to his argument: royal and baronial proxies at Runnymede, not the 
king and most of the barons, were in his view recorded as having sworn to the terms of the 
Charter there and then,169 and on that same allegedly frenetic day. He adduces examples from 
contemporary documents where the phrase refers to negotiators acting on behalf of the king 
and the barons; but in no instance are such negotiators said to have sworn on behalf of those 
they represented.170 Moreover, whereas it is obviously crucial to his case that only a small 
                                                          
165 Hugh, the newly elected abbot of Bury St Edmunds, attended on the king at Windsor on 
the evening of 9 June. John instructed him to present himself the following day on ‘the 
meadow at Staines’ to receive the kiss of peace which marked formal royal approval of his 
election. That evening, he and the king dined at Windsor: Electio Hugonis, pp. 168-70. For 
John’s movements during this period, see the itinerary in Rot. Litt. Pat.; Holt (1957) repr. in 
Holt (1985a), p. 238, for John’s ‘commuting’ during this week. 
166 Galbraith (1966), 311 n. 13; below, p. 446. 
167 Most strikingly, following caps. 37, 45, and 48: below, pl. 6, p. 246. Further, Holt (1957) 
repr. in Holt (1985a), pp. 225-6. The second half of the Unknown Charter must originally 
have looked something like this: it is clear that cap. 1 is distinct from all subsequent clauses; 
caps. 2-5 take a similar form, and seem to belong together; caps. 7, 9, and 10 begin with the 
conjunction ‘adhuc’, which suggests that they were piecemeal additions; and caps. 6, 8, and 
11 are not phrased as grants by the king. But of course the only extant copy is a later French 
one. 
168 Galbraith (1967), 352. For an indication of the pressure under which one scribe was 
working on 20 June, see Rowlands (2009), 6, 8. 
169 Carpenter (1996a), p. 13. 
170 Carpenter (1996a), p. 13. 
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group of baronial negotiators had sworn on behalf of the opposition, and that they should 
have been acutely conscious of the danger of being subsequently disowned by their own 
side,171 he offers no reason why the king should have permitted or wanted proxies to swear 
on his behalf.172 Still less is it clear why the barons, who so mistrusted John by this stage, 
would have countenanced such an unprecedented procedure, and why, had they done so, none 
of the surviving accounts remarks upon it – though it must be conceded that the chroniclers 
do not seem very well-informed about the precise course of events during this crucial ten day 
period.173 Other than Carpenter’s rendering of cap. 63, there is no evidence that such an event 
ever happened. Holt translates ‘on our part and on the part of the barons’,174 which of course 
does not mean that representatives swore on behalf of each party, but that individuals, 
including the king, swore themselves. This was what the construction often meant in 
contemporary legal documents.175 In Holt’s view, as reported by Carpenter, ‘John swore all 
right’,176 in person, probably on 19 June, after the renewal of homage.177 And by Carpenter’s 
account, Holt also rejected Carpenter’s connected claim that John had somehow managed to 
force matters to a ‘take it or leave it’ conclusion on 15 June, four days before the rebellious 
barons acceded to the peace. In Holt’s view, this made John seem like a boss negotiating with 
a trades union in the late twentieth century, not a king dealing with rebellious barons in the 
early thirteenth. Both reported comments capture the authentic tone of the master’s voice, and 
                                                          
171 Carpenter (1996a), p. 14. 
172 Carpenter (1996a), p. 13 n. 71, observes that Matthew Paris, Chron. Maj. II, 605-6, gives a 
list of those who swore to observe the orders of the Twenty-Five, but that ‘[t]here appears to 
be no list of those who swore the oath on behalf of the king’. He gives no reason for 
accepting that these were the individuals who, by his account, had sworn on 15 June, when, 
also by his account, the Twenty-Five had not yet been selected. He offers no suggestion as to 
why there was no list of those who allegedly swore on the king’s behalf. In fact, Matthew 
records the names of those in the king’s party who swore: below, p. 254 n. 70. 
173 The most detailed account, though written a decade later, is Coggeshall p. 172, who says 
that the barons assembled ‘on the specified day, between Windsor and Staines, on the 
meadow which is called Runnymede’, but fails to give the date. Cf. the Barnwell chronicler, 
Walt. Cov. II, 221, who also fails to give the date, and the Dunstable annalist, Annales 
Monastici III, 43, who gives 19 June; and below, p. 259. None of the chronicles records 
anything specifically about events on 15 June. 
174 Below, p. 473; cf. the vernacular French translation: Holt (1974) repr. in Holt (1985a), p. 
256. 
175 For instance, R.C. van Caenegem, ed., English Lawsuits from William I to Richard I, 2 
vols., Selden Soc., CVI, CVII (1990-1), nos. 606 (8 Feb. 1189), 637 (9 June 1195), 649 (25 
Dec. 1197-8 Mar. 1198); however, it could also mean ‘on behalf of’: nos. 592 (Oct.–Nov. 
1189), 641 (1189-95).  
176 Personal letter, April 2014. 
177 Below, pp. 253-4, 256. 
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can be accepted as his response to what in his view was the second noteworthy contribution 
to the scholarship of Magna Carta published since the second edition of this book.178 They are 
both forceful objections.  
We have already dealt with the possibility that John allowed negotiators to swear on 
his behalf at Runnymede on 15 June. The logic of John’s seizing on as yet unauthorised 
concessions by baronial negotiators, and immediately sealing and issuing a Charter which 
embodied them in order to wrong foot the opposition, is a curious one. Baronial negotiators, 
like royal ones, were hardly held incommunicado on the meadow. The location was 
obviously chosen to establish the security of the rebels,179 not their isolation from their 
supporters and reinforcements. It would have been easy enough for them to refer new 
proposals back to those they represented, if the key figures were not present themselves. 
There can be little certainty about who was on the meadow on 15 June, but the tactical choice 
of location suggests that the king’s opponents assembled in strength and presumably, given 
the absence of formal peace, in arms, as Ralph of Coggeshall reported. Moreover, the 
existence of an early copy of what appears to be yet another draft Charter, dated 16 June,180 
may suggest that negotiations continued in some form during the days which followed. This 
draft echoes the Windsor draft’s level for baronial relief, which is antecedent to that in Magna 
Carta, but in every other variant shares the reading of Magna Carta’s final text. If both 
variants are not simply errors, it is difficult to interpret it as anything other than a further 
draft, intermediate between the Windsor draft of 15 June and the final version of Magna 
Carta. It therefore seems that Holt was correct to stick to the position that 19 June was the 
date of the final settlement. The Charter may have recorded its date as 15 June because it was 
then that both sides accepted an authoritative penultimate draft based on the Articles. This 
was deemed to be the warrant for the eventual final version, which nevertheless embodied 
changes to that penultimate draft,181 one of which had still not been incorporated into a draft 
dated to the following day.  
                                                          
178 Carpenter recalls Holt making these comments orally. There is no letter from Holt to 
Carpenter on this subject amongst the Holt papers. 
179 Below, pp. 249-50. 
180 Found in a law book of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century: Oxford, Bodleian 
Library, MS Rawlinson C 641, fos. 21v-29r. The dating clause is in a much larger script than 
the rest of cap. 63, and lacks its contractions. It looks like the work of a different scribe. The 
date is written in words rather than numbers, so it is unlikely that it is a copyist’s error. 
Further Carpenter (1996a), 15; below, p. 446. 
181 Below, p. 446. 
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The current anniversary has inspired David Carpenter to produce a collation of the 
four surviving original engrossments of 1215 and of the copy in the letters testimonial.182 He 
kindly informs us that this has not produced any fresh information which might settle the 
matter. It is to be hoped that a more wide-ranging and definitive edition will now be 
produced. 183 This might reveal new evidence, but seems unlikely to do so, not least because 
the four extant engrossments of 1215 are so remarkably consistent. They are testimony to the 
efficiency of the operation by which the agreed text was disseminated.184 Failing new 
evidence, it seems likely to us that Holt’s view will continue to hold the field, as does his 
assessment of Langton’s role and of the putative influence of the learned law. 
Future Possibilities 
The Octocentenary of Magna Carta in 2015 will no doubt spur further reconsiderations both 
of the Charter itself and of Holt’s work. Some such studies may be of types that can 
completed within the anniversary year, for instance work based on careful examination of the 
manuscripts of the Charter,185 or on comparison of the Articles with the Charter, both 
regarding minutiae, such as alteration of mood or tense of verbs, and more general 
manifestations of political thinking, such as alterations of drafting with regard to the word 
‘regnum’, ‘realm’. Other studies will necessarily take much longer, for example the 
continuing scrutiny of the works of theologians including but not just Stephen Langton. And 
a full understanding of 1215 will require a study which Holt said he was writing but never 
completed, a study of the supporters of King John, their characteristics, their inter-
connections, and their motives – a companion to Holt’s other classic study of the rebellion 
against King John, The Northerners. Such varied investigations will ensure a still fuller 
appreciation of the present volume on its centenary, the 850th anniversary of the Charter. 
 
                                                          
182 D.A. Carpenter, Magna Carta (Harmondsworth forthcoming). 
183 Until this happens, the best guide to the manuscripts (with photographs of many) is 
Vincent (2007), with a ‘Census of Manuscripts’ at pp. 54-71, and ‘Related Texts’ at pp. 72-
81. A collation of the engrossments of 1215 by Sir John Fox in 1924 is in London, BL MS 
Add. 41178; there is a copy amongst the Holt papers at St Andrews. 
184 For the recently rediscovered text of the writ ordering publication, see Rowlands (2009), 
8-9. 
185 See above, p. 000; note also more generally The Magna Carta Project, based at the 
University of East Anglia. 
